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Introduction
The Politics of Memory in a Divided Country
In the past five years, the issue of the Holodomor,
that is, the man-made Famine of 1932-33, has occupied 
a much more prominent position in Ukrainian politics 
and society than it was ever accorded during the 1990s, 
let alone in the previous decades when the issue was ef-
fectively silenced by the Soviet authorities, and any ref-
erences to Holodomor were criminalized. For example, 
twelve years after independence and fifteen years since 
Gorbachov's glasnost, only 75 percent of respondents in 
a 2003 national survey confirmed their awareness of the 
event, while 13 percent confessed that they knew noth-
ing about the Famine, and 12 percent declined to express 
their opinion.1 Three years later, in September 2006, 
as many as 94 percent of respondents confirmed their 
awareness of the event, even though a substantial num-
ber of them (12 percent) considered that the Famine was 
mainly caused by natural phenomena.2 The main divide, 
however, shifted from a rather crude ideological contro-
versy over Holodomor recognition versus Holodomor 
denial towards a more sophisticated controversy over in-
terpretations of the Holodomor as either genocide against 
Ukrainian people or a Stalinist crime against humanity, 
which targeted both Ukrainian and Russian, Kazakh and 
other Soviet peasants.
In both cases, however, the controversy reflected and 
continues to reflect the divided character of the Ukrai-
nian polity, two different visions of the Ukrainian past 
and future, two different historical narratives and, as a 
matter of fact, two different national identities.3 Ukraine
1. Den', 21 October 2003, p. 1. The survey was conducted by
the Kyiv Institute of Sociology and the Sociology Department of the
University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.
2. “Not enough information,” The Day Weekly Digest, 21 
November 2006.
3. The issue is discussed in more detail in Mykola Riabchuk, 
“Ambiguous ‘Borderland': Ukrainian Identity on the Crossroads 
of West and East”; http://www.omp.org.pl/riabchuk.htm. See also 
Mykola Riabchuk, “Ukraine: One State, Two Countries?” Tr@nsit 
online, no. 23 (2002); www.iwm.at/t-23txt8.htm; Roman Szporluk, 
“Why Ukrainians Are Ukrainians”; and Tetiana Zhurzhenko, “The
is still a battlefield, where two different national projects 
compete for dominance, drawing their discursive and 
symbolic resources from various aspects of colonial and 
anti-colonial legacies.
The main hypothesis underlying my paper is that 
the official politics of memory in Ukraine have been as 
ambiguous and inconsistent as the politics of officialdom 
in general, both domestically and internationally. This 
ambiguity stems from the hybrid nature of the post-So-
viet regime that emerged from the compromise between 
the former ideological rivals (“national democrats” and 
“sovereign communists”), but also reflects the hybrid 
and highly ambivalent nature of Ukrainian postcolonial 
and post-totalitarian society. Since 1991, official politics, 
including the politics of memory, had been mastermind-
ed in such a way so as to not only exploit the societal 
ambivalence inherited from the past, but also to preserve 
and effectively intensify it for the future. The practical 
manifestations of such a policy under Kuchma are con-
sidered in the first part of my paper, where I discuss the 
vacillation of Ukrainian authorities over the Holodomor 
issue.
In the second part, I present some observations 
about the politics of memory of the “post-Orange” gov-
ernments. Here, I come to the conclusion that the Party 
of Regions cannot simply continue the manipulative 
practices of its crypto-Soviet predecessors, nor can the 
“Orange” parties rid themselves of post-Soviet inconsis-
tencies and ambiguity, determined by the internal divi-
sions and general ambivalence of Ukrainian society. A 
slight hope is expressed, however, that the new politics 
of memory, albeit still lacking consistency and integrity, 
is gradually coalescing in Ukraine to serve the interests 
of the nation rather than those corporate interests of any 
particular group.
Myth of Two Ukraines,” ibid.
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Part I: Political Compromise and Ambiguous
“State-Building”
Independent Ukraine came into being in 1991 as a 
result of the political compromise brokered by two very 
different, essentially opposite forces, which pragmatical-
ly joined their efforts to emancipate their country from 
the crumbling Soviet Empire. On one side, the so-called 
“national-democrats”—a broad opposition movement 
that came together during perestroika under the slogans 
of civic and national emancipation; on the other side, 
the so-called “sovereign communists”—an opportunis-
tic group of local nomenklatura that also evolved during 
perestroika within Gorbachev's camp of Soviet reform-
ers, under the official slogans of democratization and 
decentralization.
Both the national democrats and the sovereign com-
munists (who, all of a sudden, embraced democracy and 
the free market) desperately needed each other at that 
historical moment. The Ukrainian national democrats 
were too weak to take power alone: by all accounts, they 
enjoyed the support of about one-third of Ukraine's pop-
ulation, while the Sovietophile majority still perceived 
them as dangerous “nationalists” rather than moderate 
“democrats.” In the meantime, the sovereign commu-
nists enjoyed greater, albeit mostly passive public sup-
port, merely as a “lesser” or, perhaps, “better known of 
two evils.” Unlike the national democrats, they lacked 
any coherent national ideology, any “grand narrative” 
to legitimize themselves, both domestically and interna-
tionally, as a new regime that embodies and implements 
the people's right to self-determination.
Thus, Ukrainian democrats provided the ruling no-
menklatura with all the slogans and programs, symbols 
and narratives needed for state-nation building. This 
does not mean that the post-Soviet rulers embraced all 
this “nationalistic” stuff wholeheartedly. Rather, they 
accepted it opportunistically as something to be further 
bargained, negotiated and re-interpreted. On virtually all 
key points, they left some room for maneuvering. While 
the Ukrainian national narrative, in its moderate form, 
was accepted officially and adopted in textbooks (e.g., 
celebration of holidays, commemorations, memorial 
sites, etc.), the post-Soviet elite has cautiously distanced 
itself from full identification with these new symbols 
and, at the same time, refrained from fully disassociat-
ing themselves from the old symbols of the colonial/to- 
talitarian past. Semantic uncertainty facilitated political 
ambiguity: the lack of a clear commitment signified that 
nothing was predetermined, everything was subject to 
reconsideration, and it was up to the ruling elite to decide 
whether to continue the pending project or to retreat to 
its opposite. This protected their self-assigned status as 
the main power brokers who sent different messages to
different groups, thus manipulating them for their own 
personal, political gain.
The story of the Great Famine as appropriated am-
biguously by the Ukrainian post-Soviet authorities pro-
vides a graphic example of their “pragmatic”, i.e., instru-
mental, manipulative and opportunistic policies.
In the first years of Ukraine's independence, the 
post-Soviet elite apparently was made uncomfortable 
by the official commemoration of the upcoming sixtieth 
anniversary of the Great Famine. Even though they had 
made some concessions to their national-democratic al-
lies (unbiased coverage of the Famine-Genocide was in-
cluded in historical textbooks, a commemorative stamp 
was issued in 1993, and some minor monuments to the 
victims of the Famine were erected in Kyiv and else-
where), in most cases, however, commemorations were 
pushed ahead by civic/national democratic activists, 
while the post-Communist officials either kept low pro-
files or, in some regions, openly resisted. The evidence 
shows that the post-Soviet authorities declined to allo-
cate any substantial resources and to actively participate 
in national commemorative events.
Ten years later, the situation appears to have changed. 
In 2003, on the occasion of the seventieth anniversary 
of the tragedy, the Ukrainian parliament endorsed an 
official statement to the Ukrainian people, in which the 
man-made Famine was condemned as a crime against 
humanity; the Ukrainian government initiated adoption 
of a similar document in the United Nations; the Ukrai-
nian president signed a decree that established the day of 
annual commemoration of victims of the Great Famine 
on November 22 and envisaged other commemorative 
events in which both local and national officials would 
participate.
In his commemorative speech delivered that day,
President Kuchma emphatically underscored the impor-
tance of Ukraine's independent statehood (l etat, c'est 
moi) as the only reliable guardian of Ukrainians' free-
dom and, implicitly, their future survival:
Millions of innocent victims call out to us, remind-
ing us of the price of our freedom and independence, 
and affirm that only Ukrainian statehood can guaran-
tee free development of the Ukrainian people. [...] We
are obliged to convey to the international community
the bitter truth about the Holodomor, unprecedented in 
world history, so that the community of free nations can 
properly appreciate the dimensions of this tragedy, and 
the sinister plans and criminal deeds of those who mas-
terminded and organized it.4
In addition, Kuchma clearly outlined the need to 
raise the Holodomor issue at international fora, in or-
der to condemn the perpetrators of genocide and, im-
4. Quoted in Rodina, no. 1 (2007): 63.
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plicityly, elicit sympathy for the victimized nation and 
its beleaguered president. The latter assumption seems 
more than likely, if one takes into account Kuchma's do-
mestic and international troubles after Tapegate and the 
Kolchuga affair. Hence, the appeal to the “community 
of free nations,” to which Ukraine (and its president) 
presumably belong, as well as the discursive distancing 
from unspecified (but presumably Soviet) criminals and 
the symbolic (however sham) separation from the Soviet 
legacy of lawlessness.
Kuchma's personal problems may have catalyzed 
the shift in official policy in regard to the Holodomor, 
but they alone would not have sufficed if certain changes 
in public opinion had not occurred during the preceding 
decade. Roughly speaking, both society and the ruling 
elite had become less “Soviet” and, therefore, less biased 
in regard to certain historical facts and developments. A
national survey, carried out in fall 2003, revealed that 40
percent of respondents believed the Famine of 1932-33 
was “genocide carried out by the Bolshevik authorities 
against the Ukrainian people.” Twenty-five percent of 
respondents placed the blame on the Bolsheviks, albeit 
with the reservation that the man-made Famine resulted 
from their policy against all peasants, not only the Ukrai-
nian peasantry. Only 10 percent supported the traditional 
Soviet view (still defended by the Communist Party of 
Ukraine) that the Famine was not masterminded by the 
authorities, but instead was the result of natural calami-
ties. However, 13 percent confessed that they knew noth-
ing about the Famine; and 12 percent declined to give 
their opinion.5
The manner, however, in which the Ukrainian au-
thorities carried out official commemorations, as well as 
some peculiarities of both the domestic and international 
situation at the time, lead me to believe that they prob-
ably had many more personal reasons to embark on the 
project than merely reestablishing historical truth and 
justice or meeting public expectations.
First, the official commemorations had obviously 
been “export-oriented.” The Ukrainian officials had been 
much more active and visible in New York and Paris and 
in the capital city of Kyiv than in the regions, primarily 
those that were the most affected by the Famine. In the 
regions, the local authorities, by and large, declined to 
participate in commemorative events and, in some cases, 
openly sabotaged NGO initiatives.6 One should note 
that the central government had sufficient authoritarian 
levers at the time (2003) to achieve, if necessary, the
5. Den', 21 October 2003, p. 1. The survey was conducted by
the Kyiv Institute of Sociology and the Sociology Department of the
University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy.
6. See, for example, Ihor Stoliarov, “Bez zhodnykh aktsentiv,” 
L'vivska gazeta, 12 September 2003; Roman Krutsyk, “Pravda ochi 
rizhe?” Ukraina moloda, 12 November 2003; “Tserkva obrazylasia na 
Ianukovycha za holodomor,” Ukrains'ka pravda, 25 November 2003.
full obedience of the local bosses. The same could also 
be said about national TV, which was firmly controlled 
(and censored) at the time by the president's staff. All 
of them, however, conducted business as usual, making 
no changes in their programming of primarily enter-
tainment broadcasts even on the Commemoration Day 
of November 22, for the most part addressing the issue 
only in news programs in a typical manner, that is, prais-
ing the solicitous government for taking new steps in the 
right direction, but making no attempt to investigate or 
discuss this serious issue.7
Second, in all the official documents not a single 
word was said about the Communist nature of the Fam-
ine-Genocide. Among the thousand words in the state-
ment of the Ukrainian parliament, one may find angry 
references to the “Stalinist totalitarian regime,” “the dev-
ilish plan of the Stalinist regime,” “criminal nature of 
the regime,” “premeditated terrorist act of the Stalinist 
political system,” and even “high-level authorities of the 
USSR,” but nothing is said about the Communist ori-
gins and Communist nature of that regime, that system, 
and that leadership.8 It would appear that Stalinism was 
a supernatural phenomenon, a historical aberration that 
had little, if anything, to do with the essence of Soviet 
Communism.
And third, a lukewarm commemoration of victims 
of Soviet totalitarianism and a rather formal and super-
ficial condemnation of the Communist (“totalitarian,” 
as it is referred to euphemistically) crimes went hand- 
in-hand with a much more coherent and eager celebra-
tion of Communist/totalitarian leaders (e.g., Volodymyr 
Shcherbyts'kyi), organizations (e.g., Komsomol) and 
symbolic events (e.g., the so-called “re-unification” of 
western Ukrainian lands with Soviet Ukraine, i.e., im-
plementation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement).
All these facts suggest that the Ukrainian post-Com-
munist rulers tried to appropriate the symbolic value of 
the Famine and to capitalize on it both domestically and 
internationally. Domestically, they aspired to complete 
the project of their “succession of power,” which entailed 
preservation, by all possible means, of the dominance of 
the post-Soviet nomenklatura-cum-oligarchy. Interna-
tionally, they intended to whitewash the image of the re-
gime badly tarnished by various scandals, by switching 
public attention to different matters and exposing, on this 
occasion the “human face” of the post-Soviet clique.
In 1993, the “genealogical” connection between 
the post-Communist rulers and their Communist prede-
cessors was probably too close and obvious, so that an 
extensive exposure of Communist crimes would be self-
7. Volodymyr Kulyk, “Televiziynyi tsynizm i ukrains'ka hro- 
madskist',” Krytyka, vol. 7, no. 12 (December 2003): 22.




defeating. They might simply lose the political initiative 
to the national-democrats who, as allies, could not be ex-
cluded from the commemorations and who therefore had 
a good chance to take the lead and benefit symbolically 
from the event.
In 2003, the post-Communists had nothing to lose, 
because the national democrats by this time had been 
unequivocally in opposition. Now, the post-Communists 
could win—by taking initiative from their former allies- 
cum-rivals and, at the same time, excluding them from 
commemorations—at least in the mainstream media on 
which the authorities kept a firm grip.
The opportunistic nature of the post-Soviet elite was 
revealed, in this case, most graphically. In May 2003, the 
parliamentary statement that condemned the man-made 
Famine as a crime against Ukrainian people was sup-
ported by only 226 MPs—the minimum vote needed to 
pass the bill in the 450-seat parliament. While the Com-
munists voted against the measure and the national dem-
ocrats voted in favor, the majority of the pro-government 
factions abstained. Clearly, they had received a signal 
that abstaining was permissible, perhaps even desirable, 
because the president at this time had an obedient major-
ity in parliament and could mobilize up to 250 votes if 
necessary—even without the national democrats. In this 
instance, however, mobilization was not required. On the 
contrary, the post-Communist rulers wished to demon-
strate that they did not fully associate themselves with 
the “nationalistic” cause nor had they completely broken 
with the Communist legacy. It was merely a reminder 
that they held a golden share and were keeping every-
body on the hook.
Such a purely instrumental approach to historic 
events emerged naturally from the post-Communist 
strategy of holding the “centrist” niche and marginal-
izing their rivals as dangerous radicals, stupid fanatics 
or infantile romantics out of touch with reality. Discur-
sively they strived to monopolize the role of supreme 
all-national arbiter who would decide how much of the 
Communist legacy should be abandoned and how much 
of the anti-Communist legacy should be “rehabilitated.”
Part II: “Post-Orange” Developments
Three years after the spectacular Orange Revolution 
that engendered so much hope and delivered so much 
disappointment, we may aver soberly that it was neither 
a great success in the sense of a radical break with the 
Soviet past, its political culture and institutional arrange-
ments, nor was it a great failure in the sense of a resur-
gence of old oligarchic practices and corrupt schemes. 
It did not push the country dramatically ahead, towards 
“Europe” and European practices (meaning primarily 
rule of law, not just democracy). But it definitely pre-
cluded the country's decline and slipping towards post-
Soviet authoritarianism. The revolution, in fact, re-estab-
lished the evolutionary development of Ukraine, derailed 
at the end of the 1990s by the authoritarian practices of 
Leonid Kuchma.
Within three years of his tenure, President Yush-
chenko, despite his many mistakes and notorious indeci-
siveness and incoherence, has proved rather clearly that 
his politics of memory would not be tailored opportu-
nistically, but rather are based on moral principles and 
an unequivocal commitment to historical truth and jus-
tice. Such a policy clearly contradicted the conservative 
strategy pursued by his predecessors under the slogans 
of “stability,” “consent” and, ultimately, “succession of 
power.”
Yushchenko certainly should be credited for the de-
crees that, in particular, established the Institute of Na-
tional Memory (based apparently on a Polish model),9 
pushed ahead the construction of the memorial to vic-
tims of political repression and the famines of 1921-23, 
1932-33, and 1946-47 at Kyiv,10 initiated the creation of 
the Babyn Yar historical and cultural reserve,11 and intro-
duced Shevchenko Day as a national holiday.12 The most 
remarkable seems to be the decree that commissioned 
the Cabinet of Ministers to prepare and hold events to 
celebrate the anniversaries of leaders of the short-lived 
Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR, 1918-1920) and 
Western Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR, 1918-
1919), as well as Yushchenko's bold support for the Mu-
seum of Soviet Occupation in Kyiv.13
As to his political rivals from the Party of Regions, 
they seem to continue the ambiguous policy of Leonid 
Kuchma—at least at the national and international lev-
els, where they distance themselves from their Commu-
nist allies and promote a “civilized,” “gentrified” self-
image of oligarchs “with a human face.” On the regional 
level, however, their position looks less ambiguous and 
more defiant. Nevertheless, they wish to assume a na-
tional role and gain international recognition, though 
they remain deadlocked within their heavily Sovietized 
region and restrained by both their electorate and their
9. Volodymyr Pavliv, “Test na natsional'nu zrilist',” Dzerkalo 
tyzhnia, 20 August 2005, p. 5.
10. “Kyiv to build memorial to victims of political repressions 
and great Famines by 2007,” Ukrainian News Agency, 8 August 2005.
11. “Yushchenko initiates creation of Babyn Yar historical and 
cultural reserve in Kyiv,” Ukrainian News Agency, 26 September 
2005.
12. “Yushchenko introduces National Shevchenko Day to be 
celebrated every year on March 9,” Ukrainian News Agency, 17 May 
2005.
13. For a discussion of the issue see Yurii Shapoval, “Re-
producing a real tragedy or politicizing history?” The Day Weekly 
Digest, no. 18, 19 June 2007; Stanislav Kulchytsky, “Was Ukraine 
under Soviet Occupation?”Ibid., nos. 20-21, 10 and 17 July 2007; 
Mykhailo Dubynians'kyi, “Sovetskaia okkupatsiia: pro et contra,” 




own mentality. Kuchma's team was certainly in a much 
better position, since it could firmly monopolize the 
“centrist” niche and present its members as moderates 
and peace-keepers between east and west, left and right, 
Moscow and Washington, and so on. They held power 
and controlled the media, so that public initiatives could 
be effectively controlled and official discourse could be 
skillfully tailored for different regions and situations.
The Party of Regions is on the defensive; its over-
reliance on the Sovietophile electorate may bring them 
only temporary gains, as the gradual marginalization of 
the Communist Party shows rather graphically. Since 
more than two-thirds of respondents (69 percent) in a na-
tional survey believe that the Famine was caused mainly 
by the actions of the Soviet government,14 the Commu-
nist position of denying the Holodomor becomes not 
only morally and intellectually untenable but also politi-
cally unproductive.
The Party of Regions wisely abandoned the tradi-
tional Soviet view of the Holodomor as a non-event, 
or mere “natural” calamity exacerbated by sabotage of 
class enemies. They left the Communists to defend the 
indefensible, and adopted instead a more pragmatic (one 
may say opportunistic) approach that recognizes—fully 
in line with prevailing public opinion—that the Fam-
ine was man-made and the Soviet authorities had really 
committed the crime. They emphasize, however—again, 
fully in line with public opinion—that the Famine was 
not directed against Ukraine or Ukrainians only, but also 
against all the peasants in both Ukraine and beyond. 
They simplify, in fact, the argument of their opponents 
from the national democratic camp who do not claim 
so crudely that famine was a problem exclusively of 
Ukraine and of Ukrainians.
Such a simplification, however, provides them with 
a powerful weapon against the Ukrainian ethnic “nation-
alists,” identified rhetorically with the Orange camp, who 
allegedly try to ethnicize the genuinely social tragedy, 
to monopolize suffering and, moreover, to oppose and 
alienate Ukrainians against other groups, particularly 
Russians. This line of defense is much stronger, indeed, 
than the no longer tenable position of the Soviet/Com- 
munist stalwarts.
First, by recognizing the Holodomor as a Stalinist 
crime against humanity, the Party of Regions distances 
itself from the most abominable parts of the Soviet lega-
cy, representing itself as a moderate, reasonable, respon-
sible, “centrist” political force. It satisfies the majority of 
the population who hold the same view on the Holodo- 
mor, namely, that it was a Stalinist crime against peas-
ants in both Ukraine and elsewhere, rather than genocide 
targeting primarily Ukrainians. And finally, it conforms
14. “Not enough information,” The Day Weekly Digest, 21 
November 2006.
to international public opinion, including predominant 
academic views of the Holodomor, and does not alien-
ate altogether comrades in Russia who prefer the Com-
munist interpretation of Holodomor events, but who are 
prepared to compromise.
The Party of Regions thus identifies itself with both 
“scholarly truth” and “common sense,” and from this 
quasi-centrist and presumably “scientific” position it 
marginalizes and discredits its Orange opponents as ob-
sessed radicals, nationalists, and adventurers who rock 
the boat and sow ethnic discord for the sake of unspeci-
fied but partisan political gains. A limited but efficient 
set of arguments and key words is employed by the Party 
of Regions' statesmen in all discussions about the Ho- 
lodomor. They may vary in sequence and elaboration but 
essentially are as follows:
The enormous division within contemporary Ukrainian 
society is largely determined by the diametrically op-
posed points of view on many events and developments 
of our past. The supporters of radical views, from either 
one side or the other, dominate every discussion. And 
this does not help to reconcile the views or establish 
historical truth. Our society badly needs consolidation; 
a civilized dialogue and search for common ground 
based on recognition of the just aspects of each side's 
position would help bring this about.15
First, the Holodomor is presented—and rightly 
so—as a highly divisive issue in Ukrainian society. The 
recurrent key words are “split,” “division,” “break,” 
even “crack” (“packon”) —and their semantic antonyms 
“unity,” “consolidation,” “compromise,” “consent.” The 
first “destructive” set is explicitly or implicitly attributed 
to the Orange opponents, while the latter, “moderate” 
and “reconciliatory,” is appropriated by the Party of Re-
gions itself.
Since the second position is, presumably, fully in 
line with “scientific truth,” “common sense” and the 
national interest, it does not require any specific elabo-
ration. Instead, the first, deviant position—of President 
Yushchenko and his allies—is closely examined and 
disproved as not only historically and legally wrong 
but also politically harmful. First, they suggest, it sows 
interethnic discord in Ukraine, and second, badly dam-
ages relations with Russia (or, euphemistically, with our 
“neighbors”).
A conscientious desire to assume moral responsibil-
ity and restore historical justice, in and of itself, cannot 
be exploited for a multi-step political-ideological game 
that has little to do with history, but rather with the most 
contemporary of today's issues, and which is aimed pri-





marily at demoralization and weakening the positions of 
one or another elite group within society.
We believe that we need to form an ideological 
climate that would permit an honest condemna-
tion of any mass crimes in Ukraine, committed 
either by Stalin's regime or its adversaries, while 
not allowing the topic to be misused by political 
forces that are interested in creating a conflict 
between our country and its neighbors.16
Two questions, however, emerge from this type of 
argument—regardless of whether we interpret the Ho- 
lodomor as genocide or not. First, it remains unclear 
(and is never explained) what kind of practical benefits 
(“political dividends,” as another speaker implies17) can 
Orange leaders gain from this “multi-step political-ideo-
logical game”—if the majority of the population does not 
share their view of Holodomor as genocide and seems 
unlikely to change this view in the foreseeable future. 
Would it not be more reasonable to suggest that Presi-
dent Yushchenko is sacrificing, in fact, certain electoral 
“dividends” for the sake of moral principles he believes 
are crucial for the whole nation?
And second, why should the president and his 
Orange allies be “interested” in any conflict between 
Ukraine and Russia (or, as another “regional” speaker 
put it, in “creating an atmosphere hostile to Russia and 
representing the Russian people as responsible for the 
Famine and genocide, and charging Russia as a succes-
sor to the Soviet Union, both morally and financially”18)? 
In fact, neither Yushchenko nor any of the Orange lead-
ers have ever attempted to identify Russia explicitly with 
the Stalinist regime that masterminded the Holodomor. 
Certainly such accusations could emerge on the fringes, 
and such claims could be made implicitly in heated anti-
Soviet and anti-Communist rhetoric—but only to the 
extent to which today's Russia identifies itself with the 
Soviet legacy, with the dubious “glory” of Stalinism and 
Great-Russian imperialism. And since neo-Stalinism, in-
deed, tends to resurface in today's Russia, Russian anxi-
ety over Ukrainian de-Sovietization has clear ideological 
grounds.19
16. Ibid.




19. As some observers rightly point out, “while there appears to
be a creeping rehabilitation of Stalin in Russia, Ukraine's govern- 
ment—and Yushchenko in particular—is showing an interest in 
greater exposure of Stalin's crimes, including the Holodomor.” (Ivan 
Lozowy, “Ukraine: Parading Against Reconciliation,” Transitions 
Online, 11 May 2005.) See also Nick Webster, “Why does Russia
love Stalin now?” Mirror.co.uk, 4 February 2006; Owen Matthews,
“Back to the USSR. Was Stalin so bad?” Newsweek, 20 August 2007;
It is up to Russia, of course, whether it chooses to 
commemorate its own victims of the Gulag and man-
made famine—in the Kuban and elsewhere—or to cele-
brate Stalin as a “great statesman” and to bemoan the end 
of the Soviet Union as the “greatest geopolitical catastro-
phe of the twentieth century.” Ukrainians, however, may 
have their own ideas about Soviet “statesmen,” as well 
as great twentieth-century catastrophes.
True, the Party of Regions and, more generally, Rus-
sian-speaking eastern Ukrainians may be “uncomfort-
able with the label of genocide because of fear that it 
could drive a wedge between ethnic Ukrainians and eth-
nic Russians in Ukraine.”20 But the same could be said 
about the wedge between black Americans and white 
Americans in the U.S. No fear, however reasonable, can 
preclude scholars from exploring the truth and calling 
slavery slavery, and genocide genocide.
Conclusion
Three years after the Orange Revolution, Ukrainian 
history remains an ideological battleground, and the Ho- 
lodomor issue stands prominently as one of its crucial 
parts. Indeed, any approach is “politicized,” as Domi-
nique Arel aptly noted not long ago.21 Not only those 
who condemn Soviet crimes undermine politically their 
Sovietophile opponents, but also those who defend So-
viet views and values undermine their anti-Soviet and 
presumably pro-European rivals. In some cases, curi-
ously, the Holodomor as a crime of the Soviet regime 
is counterbalanced rhetorically by references to real and 
alleged crimes of anti-Soviet guerillas (OUN-UPA) and 
demands to condemn both crimes within the same docu-
ment.
Nevertheless, the changes in public opinion, howev-
er slow, inconsistent and contradictory, enabled not only 
an unprecedented level of public mobilization during the 
Orange Revolution, but also the unprecedented vote in 
Ukrainian parliament in November 2006 designating the 
Terror-Famine of 1932-33 as genocide against the Ukrai-
nian people. Even though the vote passed by a small 
margin of seven votes, only due to the crucial support of 
the Socialist Party, which once again took the “Orange” 
side, no less important was the fact that nobody dared to 
vote against the measure—the opponents of the law, with 
one exception, merely abstained. Indeed, “that wouldn't 
have happened if Ukraine's intellectuals hadn't been ar-
guing the case for the last fifteen years, thereby creating 
a discursive force that even sceptics couldn't resist.”22
“Democracy upsets Vladimir Putin,” Telegraph, 2 October 2007; 
Halya Coynash, “Ukraine: No ‘managed truth,'” Kharkiv Human 
Rights Protection Group, 11 July 2007.
20. Dominique Arel, “Holodomor buried in semantics,” Kyiv 
Post, 6 December 2006.
21. Ibid.
22. Alexander Motyl, “Two years after Orange Revolution.
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And, one may add, if Ukrainian society had not proved 
itself to be an active agent interested in the matter.
Of course, the relics of Sovietism are still salient, 
and Ukrainian society is still at odds with itself, still di-
vided and bitterly grappling with both colonial and to-
talitarian complexes and stereotypes. The ruling elite is 
a part of the same society, so it would be rather naive to 
believe that they are completely free of the imprint of 
Sovietism. All their policies, including that of memory, 
would hardly mark a radical break with the Soviet legacy 
and would probably not be as consistent and comprehen-
sive as many Ukrainophiles and Westernizers would like 
to believe. Some ambiguities in official policies seem 
unavoidable; however, they would probably not be de-
liberately devised and employed for manipulation under 
“Orange” governments, and duplicity would not be the 
essence of the official politics.
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